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NoTEs AND CoMmNs
also be necessary that defendant's act was so dangerous in itself as to
constitute criminal negligence. The real danger in employing the mis-
demeanor-manslaughter doctrine lies in the probability that convic-
tions will be had where defendant's conduct is not dangerous in itself,
or at least not dangerous in the degree required for criminal liability.
Thus it is concluded that the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine is
worthless and in some cases might work injustice, that it should be
repudiated, and that convictions should be frankly based on criminal
negligence.
WmLIAM RICE
CONTRACTS BY RAILWAY COMPANIES GRANTING TO
TAXICAB COMPANIES THE EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGE
OF SOLICITING BUSINESS ON DEPOT GROUNDS
In the recent case of Yellow Cab Co. of Ashland v. Murphy' the
Kentucky Court of Appeals overruled the holding of earlier cases in
regard to the right of a railway company to grant to a taxicab com-
pany by contract the exclusive privilege of entering and using the rail-
way company's grounds to solicit business. The Cab Company had
entered into a contract with the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway where-
by the former was granted the exclusive privilege of going on the
depot grounds to solicit the transportation of passengers and baggage.
The Company sought to enjoin the defendants from interfering in any
way with the exclusive privilege granted by the contract. The de-
fendants relied on the case of McConnell v. Pedigo2 in which the court
had declared a similar contract invalid. In the instant case the court
rejected the reasoning of the Pedigo case and thus aligned Kentucky
with the decided weight of authority on this question.
By the terms of the contract in the Pedigo case, McConnell was
granted the privilege of standing his hacks at the railway company's
mediately upon the firing of the shot? In the only case directly in point (Com. v.
Owens and Evans, 198 Ky. 655, 249 S.W. 792 (1928) the indicement charged
involuntary manslaughter of a woman known to defendants to be afflicted with
heart trouble by going to her house and "raising a racket, fuss and altercation"
with her. The court, after stating its usual definition of involuntary manslaughter,
sustained the demurrer to the indictment on the ground that the allegations that
defendants raised a racket and altercation were simply conclusions, "Without de-
termining the question of whether one may be guilty of homicide in any of its de-
grees by the commission of some unlawful act which produces in the victim excite-
ment, irritation, anger, terror or agitation.
1248 S.W. 2d 42 (Ky. 1951).
'92 Ky. 465, 18 S.W. 15 (1892).
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loading platform in consideration of his agreement to carry the U. S.
mail from the depot to the post-office. This privilege was conferred to
the exclusion of all other hacks. In construing the contract the court
apparently concluded that by its terms the railway company could
have excluded from the loading platform any other hack, even though
under a contract of hire to receive a passenger at the depot. ".... if
this power is recognized as being within what is termed a reasonable
regulation in the conduct of its business, the company can deny to
anyone carrying for hire the right of access to its depot for passengers
and freight, and thereby monopolize the entire business of transporting
passengers and freight to their proper destination .... 
As further bases for its holding, the court said that the "... con-
tract prevents competition, and makes such a discrimination as is un-
reasonable and detrimental to the public."4 By virtue of the privilege
the favored hackman would have a practical monopoly and the privi-
lege would concern a matter outside the scope of the railroad's duty
as a common carrier. Furthermore, under the court's interpretation of
the contract, a passenger who had ordered a hack would be com-
pelled to go some distance away from the platform to enter the hack,
as only McConnell's hacks could stand at the platform to receive
passengers.
The Pedigo case basically follows the reasoning used in a minority
of the jurisdictions in the United States.5 The bases of these decisions
also appear to be that such contracts would restrict and prevent
competition, tend to create a monopoly, be against the public policy,
be outside the scope of the railroad's duty, and produce inconvenience
and loss to the public.6 Some of the courts upholding the minority
view also seem to object to the railroad's making a profit by way of
arbitrarily admitting for monied consideration one cab company and
excluding all others. In an early case7 the Pennsylvania court held
that regulations for the conduct of a railroad's business should apply
* Id. at 468, S.W. at 16.
*Id. at 470, S.W. at 16.
Commonwealth v. Grau, 16 Pa. Dist. R. 806 (1907; Indianapolis Union R.
Co. v. Dohn, 153 Ind. 10, 53 N.E. 937 (1899); Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, 181
MI1. 289, 54 N.E. 825 (1899); State v. Reed, 76 Miss. 211, 24 So. 308 (1898);
Kalamazoo Hack & Bus Co. v. Sootsma, 84 Mich. 194, 47 N.W. 667 (1890);
Cravens v. Rodgers, 101 Mo. 247, 14 S.W. 106 (1890).
'Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. Dohn, 153 Ind. 10, 53 N.E. 937 (1899);
State v. Reed, 76 Miss. 211, 24 So. 308 (1898). See also Palmer Transfer Co. v.
Anderson, 131 Ky. 217, 115 S.W. 182 (1909) which followed the reasoning in the
Pedigo case.
7 Commonwealth v. Grau, 16 Pa. Dist. R. 806 (1907). This case, however,
has been overruled by the later case of Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Graham, 64 Pa,
Super. Ct. 437 (1916).
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to everyone alike and that a railroad should not be allowed to grant
by contract special favors to one cab company.
Some of these decisions have been based on statutory or constitu-
tional provisions. The Missouri court held that a contract granting
the privilege of exclusive use of a given loading platform was contrary
to public policy and to the spirit of a constitutional clause prohibiting
"... 'discrimination in charge or facilities in transportation... between
transportation companies and individuals, or in favor of either."' 8 The
court went on to say that a corollary to the cab company's duty as a
common carrier was its right to equal facilities. In this way competi-
tion would be stimulated, while, if equal facilities were not granted,
competition would be discouraged, a monopoly created, and the travel-
ing public inconvenienced. Similarly the Michigan court relied in part
upon a statutory provision in an 1890 case.9 Here the statute required
that all railroad corporations grant equal facilities for transportation
of passengers and freight to all persons, companies, or corporations.
In addition to holding that the statute was applicable and thus nul-
lified the contract, the court further held that a contract granting
exclusive privileges to a cab company would be against public policy
in that it tended to establish a monopoly and infringed upon the rights
of the public and others having or carrying on business in connection
with railroad traffic and travel.
Even though some courts construe the statutory and constitutional
provisions as nullifying contracts similar to the one in question, it is
more generally held that such provisions do not apply.10 The language
of the provisions is generally similar in requiring that railroad com-
panies give to all persons or companies reasonable and equal terms,
facilities, and accommodations for the use of its depot and other build-
ings and grounds. 1 The courts have used various reasoning processes
8 Cravens v. Rodgers, 101 Mo. 247, -, 14 S.W. 106, 108 (1890). Contra,
Commercial Travelers v. Marshall Bros. Livery Co., P.U.R. 1918 E 391 (1918).
84 Mich. 194, 47 N.W. 667 (1890). In Dingman v. Duluth, S. S. and A.
Ry. Co., 164 Mich. 328, 130 N.E. 24 (1911), the court did not expressly over-
rule the above decision, but said the "decision itself is probably not in harmony
with the current weight of authority." A number of the majority cases were then
cited and discussed by the court.
'0 A.L.R. 356 (1921).
The Kentucky Constitutional provision on the subject is sec. 214; "No rail-
way . . .company shall make any exclusive or preferential contract or arrange-
ment with any individual, association or corporation, for the receipt, transfer, de-
livery, transportation, handling, care or custody of any freight, or for the conduct
of any business as a common carrier." As is shown in the discussion developed on
interpretation of such provisions, this section governs the railway's business as a
common carrier. The reasoning followed by the majority courts is even strength-
ened by the express statement here: "or for the conduct of any business as a com-
mon carrier." Thus it would control contracts in relation to carrying passengers
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to find that the language does not include these contracts. In one case
it was held that the statute in question obviously referred to the use
of a right. The statute does not set out who can use the depot, but
only requires that those who have a right to use it shall have a use
equal to other holders of the same right. A license given by the rail-
road company to a stranger could not and should not be considered a
license to all the world.12 Other courts say the statutes apply only to
preferences by common carriers in respect to their services as such, 13
or only to persons who have a contract relation to the common car-
rier.14 A hackman who does not have a contract with the railroad
would not be within either of these classes. The Oregon court in a
1917 case' 5 applied generally the reasons given above and went on to
say the purpose of the statute was to prohibit preferences among pas-
sengers and shippers. The court also held that a section of the con-
stitution providing that "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen
or class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same
terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens," 6 relates only to the
enactment of laws and does not prohibit or regulate the right to
contract.
From the discussion above it can be seen that even where statutes
are involved a majority of the courts uphold contracts such as the one
in question. This leads into a consideration of the basic reasoning
used by the majority of courts irrespective of statutory or constitu-
tional regulation. As the Kentucky Court generally applied the reason-
ing of the majority view, the Yellow Cab case will be considered in
conjunction with other cases which have decided the particular point.
The writer will apply that reasoning to dispose of each point, where
applicable, in the Pedigo case. There will also be a discussion of other
points not raised in the Pedigo case which have served as bases for
the majority view.
One reason for the majority holding is that the railroad company
should have a right to limit the number of cab solicitors on the rail-
way's premises. The exercise of this right is correlative to the duty
as the railway's duty but would not control contracts incidental to its duty to pro-
vide for the passengers' comfort and convenience. The reasoning on this is more
fully developed in the text of this article.
Old Colony R. Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35, 17 N.E. 89 (1888).
"Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Old Dominion Baggage Transfer Co., 99 Va. 111,
37 S.E. 784 (1901); Barker v. Midland Ry. Co., 18 C. B. 46, 139 Eng. Reprint
1281 (1856).
"4New York, C. & H. R.R. Co. v. Ryan, 71 Misc. 241, 129 N.Y. Supp. 55
(1911); Godbout v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 79 Minn. 188, 81 N.W. 835 (1900).
Baggage and Omnibus Transfer Co. v. City of Portland, 84 Or. 343, 164 P.
570 (1917).
" Or. Const. Art. I, sec. 20.
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to provide for the comfort, safety, and convenience of the passengers
and to see that the passengers are not annoyed, disturbed, or ob-
structed.17 The courts then apply this rule by saying that unlimited
solicitation would be an intolerable situation. Incoming and outgoing
passengers would be subject to confusion, turmoil, importunate solici-
tations, and even danger if open competition among cabmen were
permitted on depot premises.18 Hence the limiting of solicitation is
within the railway's duty, as a common carrier must see that the
premises are clean, clear, comfortable, and pleasant.19 Furthermore,
the solicitation would be an act affecting a passenger. "A passenger's
status as such ordinarily continues from the time he has alighted from
the carrier's vehicle at his destination until he has had a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. ... 20 Even though it
may be argued that the reasoning set out above does not apply where
the contract is only for a cab stand on the premises (as in the Pedigo
case), it is submitted that such an arrangement would greatly reduce
confusion and turmoil. If no such stand were granted, instead of
vying with each other for the passenger's business the cabmen would
be arguing among themselves as to the use of the open cab-stand.
Insofar as the railway-cab company relationship is concerned, the for-
mer has no duty to permit the other to enter. Whatever is done out-
side the obligation of the railway as a public carrier is done as a mat-
ter of favor, not of right.21 A disappointed cabman, therefore, could
not complain of an infringement of his rights but could only regret the
loss of a privilege. It may well be argued that the Court in the Pedigo
case laid out a fallacious rule, when they said that granting an exclu-
sive cabstand privilege is not the lawful exercise of a right correlative
to the discharge of its duties. Even if it be conceded that the rule was
correctly stated, it would have no application in the Yellow Cab case.
This involved a contract limiting solicitation privileges and coming
clearly within the railroad's rights in the discharge of its duty to
provide for the comfort, convenience, and safety of its passengers.
Another reason for the majority holding stems from the courts'
interpretations of these contracts. As will be shown they do not con-
sider that the contracts authorize the total exclusion of all competing
7 Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279 (1905), Union Depot & Ry. Co.
v. Meeking, 42 Colo. 89, 94 P. 16 (1909).
'New York, C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Ryan, supra, note 14; Thompson's Express
and Storage Company v. Norman Mount, - N.J. -, 111 A. 173 (1920);
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Scovill, 71 Conn. 186,41 A. 236 (1898). Also see
Godbout v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 79 Minn. 188, 81 N.W. 835 (1900).
" Skaggs v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. 283 Fed. 827 (1916).
13 C.J.S. 1073 (1939).
Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Graham, 64 Pa. Super. Ct. 437 (1916).
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cab-drivers from any use of the stand. It is submitted that the Court
improperly construed the contract in the Pedigo case. By the terms of
the contract, as they were interpreted by the Court, the privileged
hackman could have excluded from the platform all competitors re-
ceiving or discharging passengers even though under contract. The
privilege of standing hacks at a loading platform, however, must be
exercised in such a way as not to interfere with the right of ingress and
egress to and from the station by passengers or prospective passengers
of the railway. Where a strip of land has been designated as a given
hackman's stand, the right of other hackmen to free access to the
depot for taking or receiving passengers with whom they have a con-
tract is not denied. The only injunction to which the favored hackman
would be entitled is one prohibiting others from obstructing him in
the use of the land as a hackstand and place of plying his vocation.22
The Court in the Yellow Cab case said, "The contract there like the
one here does not and cannot prevent others from entering the station
grounds of a railroad company to deliver or receive passengers or
baggage on an order or contract."23 The question of hackmen's rights
and privileges where the solicitation is done on the public sidewalk
outside the depot was considered in Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co.24
The United States Supreme Court in its much quoted opinion in this
case said that cabmen can use the public sidewalk while soliciting
business, provided that such use is made within reasonable limits and
that such use does not interfere with the ingress and egress of pas-
sengers and employees. The owner of land has appurtenant rights of
access to the public way and passengers, as members of the public,
have a right not to be interfered with in their use of the public way.
Hence the Court interpreted the contract in the Pedigo case too broadly
when it found other hackmen could not approach the platform for
delivering or receiving passengers under contract. The majority of
the courts do not consider these contracts to be so comprehensive,
and therefore do not invalidate the contracts on this ground.
The Court in the Pedigo case also objected to the unreasonable dis-
crimination given by the contract which merely granted a hack-stand
to McConnell. The majority of courts, however, in later cases in-
volving the exclusive privilege of soliciting business on the railroad's
premises have held it not to be an unfair or unreasonable discrimina-
tion. The writer believes that if the earlier court found the exclusive
hackstand privilege an unreasonable discrimination, it would have
-Union Depot & Ry. Co. v. Meeking, 42 Colo. 89, 94 P. 16 (1909).
243 S.W. 2d 42,45 (1951).
Supra, note 17.
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found the exclusive privilege of solicitation even more unreasonable.
The former involves convenience to passengers in seeking a cab to
hire, whereas the latter entails active bargaining by the cabman and
the passenger before the passenger knows that other cabs are avail-
able. In spite of the greater advantage offered by the latter privilege,
courts have upheld it as not unreasonable. In the Donovan case 5 the
Supreme Court admitted that any such arrangement would neces-
sarily enable the favored cab company to control, to a great extent,
the business of carrying passengers from the station. It did not, how-
ever, create a monopoly in the odious sense of that word.26 "That ar-
rangement is to be deemed, not unreasonably, a means devised for the
convenience of passengers and of the railroad company, and as in-
volving such use by the company of its property as is consistent with
the proper performance of its public duties and its ownership of the
property in question."27 If the arrangement is reasonable and proper
for the public and does not tend to deprive them of the proper oppor-
tunity to control their actions after leaving the depot, there is no
ground for complaint. Furthermore there is no substantial denial of
the public's rights as cabs are still free to enter the premises under the
passenger's order, and as the drivers are entitled to solicit on premises
adjacent to the railway's premises. Thus passengers are still free to
engage whom they please, and cannot claim their rights have been
' Supra, note 17.
' "The modem meaning of monopoly is a combination, organization, or entity
so extensive, exclusive, and unified that its tendency is to prevent competition in
its comprehensive sense with the consequent power to control prices to the public
harm." BALxNTzE's LAW DIcmoNAnY, 830 (1930). "According to the common
law rule, not every restraint of trade is illegal. In order to be illegal, the restraint
must be unreasonable. It is also essential to render an agreement in restraint of
trade illegal that the public either has been or inevitably will be injured. .... The
combination is not illegal if the restraint of trade is no more than is necessary for
its protection and not such as to injure the public." Within the language of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts the following definition has been applied: "A combina-
tion of capital which by reason of its size and preponderant position in the business,
has the power and purpose, or uses its power to exclude others from the business
by illegal acts and unlawful and unfair methods of competition is an attempt at
monopoly and illegal at the common law." CARK, W. L. JR., HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CO'r.C'rS 434 (4th ed. 1931). It is submitted that the contracts in
question do not create such monopolies as come within the above definitions. It isnot a "combination so extensive that its tendency is to prevent competition in itscomprehensive sense so that it can control prices to the public harm." The con-
tract governs the cab business only at one particular spot and does not prevent all
competition at that spot Admittedly it gives a big advantage to the favored cab
company but it does not grant exclusive control of the business. By the same token.
it is not an unreasonable restraint in view of its purpose and of its extent. And it
is not felt tbat by these contracts the public has been or inevitably will be injured.
One cannot escape the fact that these contracts only grant a favor and do not en-tirely prevent competition, either at the given depot or elsewhere.
C Th question of the convenience to the passengers has been discussed supra
and the question of the railroad's use of its property is diseussed infra.
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interfered with. In the Yellow Cab case the Court applied the above
reasoning and held that there was not in fact a monopoly created,
especially since the cabs could not be denied the right of entry to dis-
charge or receive passengers under contract.
There was a fourth point raised in the Pedigo case, i.e., the incon-
venience to the passenger from allowing only one company to furnish
cabs convenient to the loading platform. Such an inconvenience would
exist if the passenger were required to walk some distance in order to
board a cab other than one having stand rights. This inconvenience
resulted, however, only from the court's misinterpretation of the con-
tract. As shown above the contract was considered as prohibiting all
other cabs from using the platform. But, as also shown above, the
terms of the contract properly construed did not require such a broad
prohibition, and other cabs could use the platform on order by the
passenger. Hence the only inconvenience would be a wait that was
longer by a few seconds. The passenger would have this slightly
longer wait for cabs which did not have the privilege of using part of
the depot grounds as a cab stand. If it could be shown that there
was a great inconvenience to the passenger, or even an inadequacy or
unfairness of service by the favored cabman, the objection thereto
could not be raised by the disappointed cabman. Any failure of the
duty to provide for the passenger's comfort and convenience would
have to be called to the attention of the court by the person injured or
by the proper authorities. 28 In the cases discussed the party com-
' Supra, note 17. In the Donovan opinion the Supreme Court cites Chicago,
St. L., & N.O.R. Co. v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 189 U.S. 79, 87, (1890) and
the Express cases, 117 U.S. 1, 24 (1885). The railway company had a contract
providing for the exclusive furnishing of sleeping car facilities in the one case and
for the exclusive handling of express baggage in the other. The court held that
so long as the public were reasonably served by these companies, there could be no
complaint. The railroads, it said, were merely hiring other agencies to assist them
in the fulfillment of their duties. Considering the need for uniformity of service
and consistency of mehods there was not such an unreasonable restraint of trade
as to constitute a monopoly. Furthermore, these contracts, once made, merely pre-
vented the competitors from performing on the given line, but did not prohibit
their competing for the privilege or their performing similar services on other lines.
It is submitted, however, that the cases mentioned above are not directly in point
with the instant case. The duty in the cases cited was to actively furnish certain
facilities for the benefit of the passengers. It is clearly essential that there be only
one company furnishing such facilities in order to achieve some degree of uni-
formity. And this uniformity, as well as the absence of open competition where
the passenger is in the hands of the railroad, works to the benefit of the passenger.
But in the instant case the duty was to prevent confusion and inconvenience, or,
to put it in the active phase, to provide for the comfort and convenience of pas-
sengers around the depot. The contract in question was one way to prevent such
confusion and inconvenience or to provide for such comfort and convenience.
Hence in the former instance we have compliance with the contractual duties
serving as an end in itself, while in the latter case, compliance with the terms of
the contract will serve as a means to an end.
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plaining of the contract was a cabman-not a passenger who has been
injured by a failure of the railroad to fulfill its duty. As a third party,
not conncted with the contract, and as a cabman, he could not com-
plain of the violation of a duty to the public.29 The writer believes,
therefore, that the dictum in the Pedigo case concerning inconvenience
should have, and did have, no weight in the Yellow Cab case. The
dictum was based on an erroneous assumption, and even had the as-
sumption not been erroneous, the proper party did not complain of
the breach of the obligation.
In addition to the above-given reasons for overruling the early
Kentucky view, there are at least two other factors which are con-
sidered by the majority courts. The first is the right of the railway
company to use its own property as it sees fit and the second is the
right of an individual to freely enter contracts. In relation to the first
factor, cases have held that railroad property must be devoted prin-
cipally to the public use to the extent necessary for public objects in-
tended to be accomplished. 30 Aside from these objects, however, a
railway has ordinary private property rights to exclude all who seek
entry without superior legal title. There is a right of entry in those
who seek to avail themselves of the railroad's services as a carrier.3 '
Cabmen, however, cannot claim by virtue of the right to deliver or re-
ceive passengers contracting with them the further right to enter the
grounds solely for their own business.32 Nor can the cabmen come
on the land by virtue of any duty. They do not owe a duty to incom-
ing passengers to meet them at the station and solicit their patronage.
If they do enter the premises, they do so in a private interest, not
under a duty to the public or the railroad.33 Concerning this factor
the Supreme Court's opinion in the Donovan case is very clear. The
Court had said that the railroad's use of its property must be devoted
primarily to public use and to the extent necessary for the public ob-
m Supra, note 21. See also Atlanta Terminal Co. v. American Baggage and
Transfer Co., 125 Ga. 677, 54 S.E. 711 (1906).
Supra, note 21.3 New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Scovill, supra, note 18.
"In the case of Barker v. Midland Ry. Co., 18 C.B. 46, 139 Eng. Reprint
1281 (1856) Willes, J., said, "It certainly would be somewhat extraordinary if any
such right (to enter depot grounds) could exist in one to whom the company owes
no direct duty, but who merely brings to the station the individuals with whom
the company contracts." Jervis, C.J., held that, as the bus company was not seek-
ing to use the railway, the bus could not come upon the land. A fortioi the com-
pany could not enter the depot grounds for its own profit. It is believed that the
statements made above are too broad, but, taken together, they are illustrative of
the distinction to be made between a right of entry for the purpose of delivering
passengers under contract and a right of entry for the purpose of gaining a
private profit.
Hedding v. Gallagher, 72 N.H. 377, 57 A. 225 (1903).
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jects intended td be accomplished. The Court then continued as fol-
lows:
"It by no means follows, however, that the company may not
establish such reasonable rules, in respect of the use of its property,
as the public convenience and its interests may suggest, provided
only that such rules are consistent with the ends for which the
corporation was created and not inconsistent with public regulations
legally established for the conduct of its business. Although its func-
tions are public in their nature, the company holds the legal title to
the property which it has undertaken to employ in the discharge of
those functions. . . It is required, under all circumstances, to do
what may be reasonably necessary and suitable for the accomodation
of passengers and shippers .... It is not bound to so use its property
that others, having no business with it, may make profit to them-
selves. Its property is to be deemed, in every legal sense, private
property as between it and those of the general public who have no
occasion to use it for purposes of transportation."'
In brief, then the majority of courts say that railways are entitled to
the exclusive private ownership and possession of their property, ex-
cept as modified by the rights of the public in relation to the railway
as a carrier. Anyone seeking to use the property for his own benefit
cannot avail himself of that modification to authorize his using the
property. A cabman clearly seeks to use the property for his own
benefit and hence, does not have an absolute right to use the rail-
road's premises.3 5
Besides the railway's right to the unhindered use of its property,
a second factor is given consideration by the majority courts. This
factor, the freedom to contract was given great weight in the uphold-
ing of the Yellow Cab contract. Quoting the opinion of Sir George
Jessel, M.R., in an early English case,36 the court said, "... com-
"Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279, 293 (1905).
'Union Depot & Ry. Co. v. Meeking 42 Colo. 89, 94 P. 16 (1909); Atlanta
Terminal Co. v. American Baggage and Transfer Co. 125 Ga. 677, 54 S.E. 711
(1906); Skaggs v. Kansas City Terminal, supra, note 19. For a further discussion
on this point see Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). It will be noted that the Black &
White Taxicab case involved a contract which was of the type in question and
which was made in Kentucky. The Supreme Court decided the case contra to the
Kentucky rule at that time. It was decided under the theory of Swift v. Tyson,
16 Pet. 1, 18 (1942) viz., in diversity of citizenship cases the federal courts do not,
in matters of general jurisprudence, have to apply the unwritten law as interpreted
by the highest court of the state where the case arose. Instead they can apply
their own notions of the common law. Thus there could be the opposite holdings
in the Black and White Taxicab and the Pedigo cases. The theory of Justice
Holmes in his dissent in the Black & White case was followed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
overruling the Swift v. Tyson doctrine. Under the holding in the case federal
courts must apply the unwritten law as interpreted by the highest court in the
state, except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or acts of Congress.
Now the federal decision would have to be in accord with the Kentucky decision.
'Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 462, 21
Eng. Rul. Cas. 696 (1875).
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petent persons 'shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that
their contracts, when entered into fairly and voluntarily shall be held
sacred, and shall be enforced by Courts of justice.'""3 Jessel in the
above-cited opinion also stated that courts should not extend the doc-
trine of contracts being void as against public policy, because one of
the prime tenets of public policy is that freedom of contract be not
interfered with. The United States Supreme Court also requires
limited application of the "void as against public policy" doctrine.
38
A clear detriment to the public interest will not be presumed where
nothing sinister or improper is done or contemplated. Applying this
theory to the cases at hand it is believed that the contracts should be
upheld unless it could be clearly shown that the public has suffered
by reason of the contract. The writer does not believe any such
showing could have been made in either the Pedigo or Yellow Cab
cases.
In view of the reasons given by the majority and of the reasons
given for the Pedigo holding, it is submitted that the Kentucky Court
of Appeals has brought this state into accord with the logical view on
contracts by railway companies granting to cab companies exclusive
solicitation privileges. The evils complained of in the Pedigo case were
theoretical and based on a misinterpretation of the terms of the con-
tract, or were so unusual or intermittent as to be outweighed by the
other interests involved. It is therefore concluded that the Kentucky
law is improved and modernized by the decision in the instant case.
JoHN T. BALLANTmE
-243 S.W. 2d 42, 45 (1951).
' Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199 (1927). Thus in the instant case there
are involved conflicting aspects of public policy in relation to contracts. On the
one band is the doctrine favoring freedom of contract and on the other the one
forbidding the creation by contract of combinations in restraint of trade. As shown
in note 26, supra, it is the writer's opinion that the contract in question is not one
that unreasonably restrains trade and hence should be upheld under the freedom
of contract theory. It must be noted, however, under the concepts in relation to
public policy on contracts may change over a period of time. Currently freedom
of contract is not nearly so broad as it was at the time of Lochner v. State of New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1904) and Adkins v. Children's Hospital of District of Colum-
bia, 261 U.S. 524 (1923). It has been limited by the expanding concept of the
public welfare. There is a tendency to invalidate contracts, the terms of which
might menace the health, safety, morals, and public welfare. Just what concerns
this public interest is a matter for the determination of the legislature, which is
given broad limits in the exercise of its powers. Thus the freedom to contract is
not an absolute right, but is one limited by regulations and prohibitions as imposed
by the legislature. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 800 U.S. 379 (1937). See
also the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. State of
Missouri, 72 S. Ct. 405 (1952) for other cases on this point.
